Central Africa’s Fragile Peace: Unpacking the Complexities of the Washington Agreement

On June 27, 2025, a significant peace agreement was signed in Washington D.C. between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, under the mediation of the United States. While hailed as a milestone in diplomacy, this deal raises several critical questions due to its unusual circumstances and the many unresolved issues in Central Africa it leaves in its wake. This article delves into the intricacies of the agreement, its limitations, and the broader challenges facing Central Africa’s quest for lasting stability.

Unusual Circumstances Surrounding the Agreement

One of the most striking features of the Washington dea in Central Africal is that it was signed by two states that, technically speaking, are not officially at war. Rwanda has consistently denied any direct involvement in the ongoing insurgencies within the DRC, particularly rejecting accusations of supporting the M23 rebel group or deploying the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) across the border. From Kigali’s perspective, the conflict is an internal Congolese matter, making its participation in a bilateral peace deal in Central Africa seem paradoxical.

Furthermore, the main armed actor in this conflict the M23 rebel faction is conspicuously absent from the agreement. The rebel group was neither a participant in the negotiations nor a signatory to the treaty. The document only references the ongoing talks between the Congolese government and the M23 under Qatari mediation, underscoring a critical disconnect. Essentially, the two countries not at war have reached an agreement, while the actual combatants remain outside the formal peace process.

Security Concerns and Ambiguities in the Deal

The agreement addresses mutual security worries through provisions centered on the neutralization of the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandan rebel group operating within eastern DRC. Rwanda has long cited the presence of the FDLR as justification for its military activities along the border. While the responsibility to disarm the FDLR falls to the Congolese army (FARDC), questions arise about how this can be effectively achieved in areas controlled by the M23, given their resistance to the government in Central Africa.

Moreover, the language used regarding the withdrawal of Rwandan forces is deliberately vague. Terms like “Disengagement of Forces” and “Lifting of Defensive Measures” are crafted to allow both parties to claim compliance without explicitly confirming troop movements. This ambiguity enables the DRC to maintain its stance that Rwanda has military forces inside its territory, while Rwanda continues to deny such claims, insisting it only strengthened its border defenses.

This lack of clarity conflicts with prior United Nations Security Council resolutions, notably Resolution 2773, which demanded that the M23 halt its military operations and that Rwanda immediately cease supporting the group and withdraw any forces from the DRC. Recent UN expert reports from July 2025 further challenged Rwanda’s stated motives, suggesting its support for M23 is driven more by territorial ambitions than by concerns over the FDLR.

The Role of the M23 and the Doha Mediation

The success of the Washington agreement hinges heavily on the actions of the M23 rebel movement, despite its absence from the negotiations. In early 2025, the M23 controlled significant portions of North and South Kivu, even seizing major cities like Goma and Bukavu. After initially refusing direct engagement with the rebels, citing their alleged Rwandan backing, the Congolese government later joined M23 in a joint statement agreeing to a cessation of hostilities, mediated by Qatar.

However, this is not the first ceasefire attempt, and past agreements have repeatedly fallen apart. The Doha process produced a “Declaration of Principles” in July 2025, but its vague language and lack of enforcement mechanisms have left its effectiveness in doubt. The M23’s incentives to relinquish territory and economic resources remain weak, further complicating prospects for peace. Ultimately, Rwanda’s continued support or withdrawal of support will likely determine whether the rebel group endures or collapses, as it did in 2013.

Economic Dimensions and Regional Integration

A notable feature of the Washington agreement is its economic cooperation framework, reflecting a transactional approach inspired by recent U.S. foreign policy trends. In February 2025, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi proposed a $3 billion “strategic partnership” with the United States, granting access to the region’s critical mineral reserves in exchange for security assurances.

The agreement outlines joint initiatives including national park management, hydropower development, and formalized mineral supply chains spanning from extraction to processing. It envisions cooperation not only between the DRC and Rwanda but also with American investors and government entities. Yet, skepticism remains about the feasibility of this vision, given Rwanda’s history of illicit resource exploitation in eastern Congo.

Persistent Challenges and Unresolved Issues

Despite being touted as “historic,” the peace deal leaves numerous pressing challenges unaddressed. The M23 rebels have dismissed the agreement as insufficient, branding the framing of the conflict as a simple bilateral dispute a “deception.” Meanwhile, the presence of the FDLR, often intertwined with the M23’s zones of control, complicates efforts to neutralize this armed group. Rwanda insists it will maintain its military posture until the FDLR threat is eliminated, yet it has a dubious track record in genuinely confronting the group.

Further complicating the situation are other armed factions, both Congolese and foreign, active throughout the region. These groups have resisted disarmament for decades, feeding ongoing insecurity and instability. Additionally, regional rivalries such as the hostile relationship between Rwanda and Burundi, and the ambiguous ties between Rwanda and Uganda exacerbate the conflict dynamics. Both Uganda and Burundi maintain military presence within the DRC, often shifting alliances, creating a volatile geopolitical landscape.

The Underlying Weakness of the Congolese State

At the heart of the Central African conflict lies the profound fragility of the Congolese state. The government struggles to exert sovereignty over its vast territory, unable to perform basic functions like effective border control or resource management. The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) reflect this weakness, often entangled with external armies, rebel groups, and illegal exploitation networks.

Without a concerted effort towards state reconstruction, encompassing security sector reform and economic governance, neither national development nor regional stability is attainable. The Washington peace agreement, while a step forward in diplomacy, fails to address these foundational issues.

Conclusion: A Precarious Step Forward Amid Deep Uncertainties

The June 2025 Washington agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda presents a complex, ambiguous, and somewhat paradoxical attempt at peace in Central Africa. While it signifies diplomatic progress, its limitations are clear. Key conflict actors remain outside the formal process, security challenges persist, and regional rivalries continue to fuel instability.

Moreover, the agreement’s economic ambitions, though promising on paper, must overcome a legacy of mistrust and exploitation to become viable. Above all, the enduring weakness of the Congolese state remains the fundamental obstacle to peace and security in the region. Without addressing this core issue, any peace deal risks becoming yet another fragile arrangement, vulnerable to collapse.

For lasting peace in Central Africa, future efforts must involve inclusive negotiations with all armed groups, transparent security arrangements, genuine regional cooperation, and a determined push for state-building within the DRC. Until then, the Washington deal stands as a tentative, partial solution, reflecting both the hopes and the deep complexities of Central Africa’s ongoing conflicts.

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