Ghana bets on Moscow as Russia deepens Africa ties

Ghana bets on Moscow as Russia deepens Africa ties

Accra weighs the practical stakes of Moscow's renewed African push

In Accra, the questions raised by Russia’s courtship of Africa land on real desks. Ghana’s president, John Mahama, led his country’s delegation to the third Russia-Africa summit in Moscow, where six Ghanaian speakers took part in the business programme. His government reached an agreement with Moscow on bauxite mining and alumina refining, and Russia has committed to help develop Ghana’s first nuclear power plant. For Ghanaian workers, farmers and policymakers, these are concrete matters: who refines the country’s bauxite, where the electricity comes from, and at what cost to the country’s other relationships.

Mahama’s presence in Moscow reflects a pragmatism familiar across the continent. He studied in the Soviet Union, and he has praised Moscow’s support for Africa’s anti-colonial struggles. Yet he has also directly challenged President Vladimir Putin over Russia’s coercive recruitment of Ghanaians for its war against Ukraine, a practice that risks eroding the very bilateral trust the nuclear project depends on. As the analysis shows, African governments choose partners based on their ability to deliver socio-economic growth, industrialisation and job creation, not on ideology alone.

The summit itself, held in late October, was framed by the Kremlin as proof that Russia is returning to Africa as a global power, carrying the Soviet legacy of backing anti-colonial movements. Putin used the occasion, and his public appearances around it, to advance another ambition: a place for Russia at the top table of world politics ahead of his November 19th meeting with Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. The Russian president appears to be searching for what he calls a “new Yalta,” in which he, playing Stalin’s role, would bargain with two other great powers over spheres of influence. Hosting African leaders was part of his effort to present himself as a statesman with the authority to redraw the world’s political map.

What that means for ordinary Africans is harder to see. The second summit in 2023 drew criticism for delivering little benefit to the continent. Putin responded by mobilising Russian agencies and state-backed actors: by 2026, two ministerial conferences, a new Department for Partnership with Africa in the foreign ministry, and United Russia’s “For the Freedom of Nations!” movement building a wider anti-colonial network of parties. The Kremlin also hosted youth gatherings and media forums, including new sessions at the third summit bringing together Russian and African journalists and media executives, organisations that can form part of Russia’s wider disinformation campaigns.

Meanwhile, the economics behind the rhetoric tell their own story. Putin missed the target he set in 2019 of doubling trade with Africa to around $40bn in five years, and now aims for $50bn by 2030. Russia’s goods trade with Africa totalled $27bn in 2025, roughly what it trades with Kazakhstan, while EU-Africa goods trade reached €356bn. Russia accounts for less than 1% of Africa’s inward foreign direct investment stock, far behind China, the US and the EU. Russian agricultural exports to Africa did reach $2.9bn in the first half of 2026, up 35% in value on the same period in 2025, but the war in Ukraine is disrupting Ukrainian grain exports, creating friction with African governments seeking reliable supplies via the Black Sea.

Unable to compete economically, Moscow has shifted its language. Over the last seven years, trade and investment terms fell by more than half in Putin’s speeches, while references to sovereignty gained prominence by 2026, tapping into anti-French and European sentiment, especially in West Africa. Education and Russian language references nearly doubled in his speeches, and information-related terms more than doubled.

Where security remains the foundation, the human realities are stark. Russia has deployed forces in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Libya and Equatorial Guinea, formalised defence cooperation with Togo, and pursues a military base in Sudan. Speakers from these eight states rose from 5% of the summit rosters in 2019 to 23% in 2026. Elsewhere, engagement fluctuates with governments and their search for diversified partnerships. South Africa in 2026 sent its foreign ministry’s director general and Nigeria a junior foreign minister, replacing the presidents who attended in 2019, with their business programme speaker counts falling from 14 to five and seven to three respectively.

For European policymakers, the lesson from confidential conversations between ECFR’s Africa programme and African policymakers is that leaders want pragmatic partners who acknowledge the legacy of European colonialism and accept that Africa has options. Europeans can identify where Russian actors work at cross-purposes, such as the late Yevgeny Prigozhin welcoming the 2023 Niger coup while Russia’s foreign ministry backed ECOWAS in restoring constitutional order, and where his son Pavel has held on to Wagner’s operations in the CAR despite the defence ministry’s efforts to absorb them. They can also back African-led projects like the African Continental Free Trade Area, which received EU technical and financial support. As the European Council on Foreign Relations argues in its analysis at https://ecfr.eu/article/choreographing-a-comeback-what-russias-africa-policy-means-for-europe/, reliability is the quality Russian cooperation has yet to achieve, and it is the ground on which European credibility with African citizens and governments will ultimately be built. Forums like the AU-EU Senior Officials Meeting in Addis Ababa, and high-level European engagement such as German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s attendance at the upcoming German-African Business Summit in Ghana, signal how seriously Europe takes that task. African partners, for their part, are not waiting.

Q&A

What agreements did Ghana reach with Russia at the summit?

Ghana's government reached an agreement with Moscow on bauxite mining and alumina refining, and Russia committed to help develop Ghana's first nuclear power plant.

Why is John Mahama's attendance significant?

Mahama studied in the Soviet Union and has praised Moscow's support for Africa's anti-colonial struggles, but he has also directly challenged Putin over Russia's coercive recruitment of Ghanaians for its war against Ukraine.

How does Russia's trade with Africa compare with other partners?

Russia's goods trade with Africa totalled $27bn in 2025, roughly what it trades with Kazakhstan, while EU-Africa goods trade reached €356bn. Russia accounts for less than 1% of Africa's inward foreign direct investment stock.

Where does Russia maintain a security presence in Africa?

Russia has deployed forces in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Libya and Equatorial Guinea, formalised defence cooperation with Togo, and pursues a military base in Sudan.

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